Ukraine could use imported weapons to strike Russia: what took so long?

French President Macron visits German Chancellor Scholz and makes several shocking statements, including that Ukraine should be allowed to strike inside Russian territory with weapons supplied by the West. Canada publicly authorizes Ukraine to do so with Canadian weapons. Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Blinken finally appears to concede the same point, saying that Ukraine could “adapt and adjust” its use of the weapons it has, i.e. striking targets at its disposal. interior of Russia if necessary. As Russian forces increasingly issue orders from within Russia's declared borders, the West has belatedly responded with such resolutions. The question is why it took so long and what the initial concern was.

Most commentators put it this way: although the West didn't want Ukraine to lose, it didn't want Russia to lose either. If this principle seems mysterious and contradictory, it translated into a concrete result on the ground: the de facto occupation by Russia and the maintenance of a clear part of Ukrainian territory to the east and south. The problem is that Moscow has not accepted this tacit offer. Instead, Putin moved forward and began bombing deep into Ukraine, attacking civilian centers in cities and eventually heading toward Karkhiv. As a result, after two years of war, the position of the West began to change, first with the Eastern European and Baltic states, followed now, it seems, by Canada , France, even Germany and perhaps the United States.

What were they afraid of in the first place, this idea of ​​Russia “losing”. What if Russia loses – what fear-filled scenario has haunted top Western leaders, like Biden, to the point of sacrificing thousands of Ukrainian lives, civilian and military, to avoid a Russian defeat? Again, most commentators have intuited this scenario as fear of Russia's disintegration, of a regional divide – given that none of the hesitant Western leaders have actually openly expressed his fear. In reality, the fact that the Russians lost the invasion(s) of Ukraine did not necessarily mean the collapse of Russia. This did not necessarily mean that Putin would bomb Western capitals at random – although he implied that he would. This did not mean that the Moscow regime would collapse if Russian troops withdrew from Ukraine's borders.

But this is true: Putin has invested his threadbare legitimacy to restore Russian imperial glory and global influence. If he lost in Ukraine, his raison d'être would evaporate, along with his internal popularity. The various pillars that support the State would wobble. The Orthodox Church, for example, would falter, suddenly linked to a losing regime, rather than to a great triumphant invigorator of the conquering history of Christian orthodoxy. Internal security organs would be ridiculed for reinforcing the power of a failing leader. Oligarch circles would shed their fear-based allegiance to Putin. And let's not forget that both times Moscow's central power collapsed in the last century it was because of failed foreign wars: World War I and Afghanistan. So yes, a ripple effect to the gates of the Kremlin could occur if Putin fails in Ukraine.

And so? How bad could it be? Why is this more worrying than the massacre of Ukrainians? Let's consider the scenarios. Putin implodes, instability, civil war and control over nuclear weapons loosen. This is a plausible scenario, but not decisive, because the chain of command for nuclear weapons does not evaporate with Putin's departure. This is not the case with the collapse of the Soviet Union. And anyone who overthrows Putin knows that one must not risk the destruction of Russia and the world with a crazy decision. That aside, the civil war in Russia is not, or should not be, a concern to the West. This is not a rare occurrence. In fact, most current and former Soviet colonies welcome the prospect.

The truth is that the Russian Federation, like the Soviet Union, is a centripetal construct – it wants to collapse – with regions yearning for their own future, partly for ethnic reasons and partly because it has always been a forced unity. None of these populations received exceptional benefits. They remained poor, underdeveloped and dependent on alcohol. Certainly, there is a possibility of mass movements of refugees towards the West, but local populations will stay put if they benefit from selling their natural resources directly to the world rather than through Moscow.

No, the great fear in Washington and Berlin is rather internal: the fear of internal economic consequences. The banking, fossil fuel and raw materials sectors play an important role in our economies. They have a say in Washington, and you can't blame them for being anxious. The disruption of their business with Russian territory can certainly affect Western domestic economic conditions – rising oil prices, etc. – and these lobbies are happy to dwell on all the other fears mentioned above. This probably explains, at least in part, the delays in providing Ukraine with sufficient weapons and the bans on their use – until now. Putin has been given a yellow light several times since he first bombed Chechnya to smithereens and he has gone beyond the warning signs each time. It is now clear to our leaders that further indulging him is more dangerous than all the disadvantages of Russia ostensibly losing the war in Ukraine and all the supposed consequences that entails.