Should Ukraine be allowed to use Western weapons on Russian territory?

Can you understand Olaf Scholz's hesitations on this question?

The hesitation shown by Germany, politicians from other countries and a number of experts is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the factors that determine Russia's international behavior. Moscow's current foreign policy – ​​whether using military or other means – aims to achieve results that can be sold as successes to the Russian population.

Although the Russian regime is authoritarian, it depends on stable support from elites and the population at large. Putin's adventurism has grown over the past quarter century against a backdrop of Moscow's military aggression remaining more or less unpunished, or Western punitive measures turning out to be aerial acts.

Russia's external aggression – whether in Georgia, Syria or Ukraine – appears to have been successful at relatively low cost. They were and are more or less popular with the Russian political elite and ordinary citizens, as the survey results show. Ukraine's ability to retaliate with Western weapons on Russian territory is likely to call into question Putin's past and future in the eyes of many Russians. This could therefore – for all the Kremlin's continued warlike rhetoric – reduce rather than increase the regime's readiness for aggression and escalation.

What dangers do you consider to be real and what arguments does Scholz put forward to support his position?

There is of course a risk of tensions escalating into a pan-European nuclear war between NATO and Moscow. However, this danger has existed for 70 years now and was also prevalent at a time when there were many more atomic warheads in Europe than today. Wouldn't it have been wise, in the 1950s, to respond positively to Stalin's idea of ​​separating West Germany from Western structures? Wouldn't that have been a good peace policy at the time? Shouldn't the USSR have been allowed to station nuclear missiles in Cuba in the 1960s? Wasn't Kennedy an irresponsible warmonger at the time? Other similar examples could be added.

Another case from recent history: in 2015, Turkey deliberately and openly shot down a Russian fighter-bomber over Syria. The two Russian pilots were killed. Russia's response was all kinds of threats and temporary economic sanctions against Turkey. However, after about a year, Turkish-Russian relations practically returned to normal.

To what extent do you see the possibility that Putin could “impose” attacks causing civilian casualties on Russian territory in the West?

Such so-called false flag actions are possible, even probable. The prototype of this tactic were the mysterious bombings in Moscow, Buynaksk and Volgodonsk in the fall of 1999, the political repercussions of which propelled Putin to the presidency for the first time in the spring of 2000. But the question would arise today because of how exactly Russia should respond to alleged, self-orchestrated Western crimes against Russian civilians.

Moscow will continue to want to achieve results that can be sold to the population as successes. Russia directly involving the West in the Russo-Ukrainian war (or accusing them of such involvement) would shift the balance of power in Eastern Europe and reduce Moscow's chances of success. One could even say that this would be in Ukraine's interests. The Kremlin will therefore avoid an escalation of political tensions with the West to the point of a direct military confrontation with NATO, despite the aggressive rhetoric of Putin and Medvedev.

US Secretary of State Blinken is now also hinting at US flexibility regarding the limited use of Western weapons on Russian territory. Would it be a game changer for the war if the United States followed the Europeans?

This would undoubtedly be a step in the right direction, but it alone would not be enough to change the course of the war in the short term. This would require more concerted measures, such as a combination of previous approaches with

• delivery of more effective weapons to Ukraine (combat aircraft, Taurus cruise missiles, etc.),
• confiscation of frozen Russian funds and their transfer to Ukraine
• strengthening of economic sanctions against Russia and its trading partners
• NATO takes over the air defense of western Ukraine, and

• deployment of foreign troops from willing partner countries to Ukraine's rear.

Such a comprehensive program would not only change the course of the war, but also demonstrate to Moscow the desperation and risk of further escalation. Putin's military success would be harder to achieve and would pave the way for meaningful peace negotiations between Ukraine and Russia.

Andreas Umland is an analyst at the Stockholm Center for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS) at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI).

The opinions expressed in this opinion article are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Kyiv Post.