IntelBrief: Two fronts linked to October 7 close to the eruption

Since October 7, diplomats and experts around the world have warned that Israel's war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip could turn into a regional conflagration involving several regional and global powers, including the UNITED STATES. Recognizing this potential, U.S. and Iranian officials have undertaken a series of indirect negotiations in the Sultanate of Oman to avoid a direct conflict that could result from Iran's support for its attacking “Axis of Resistance” allies. Israel, US forces in Iraq and Syria, and commercial shipping in the Red Sea. Despite this commitment, the region is on the brink of all-out war, with American and Arab diplomats having failed so far to end the war in Gaza. In April, Israel and Iran engaged in an unprecedented direct clash following Israeli attacks on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) in Syria.

The FQ-IRGC operates in Syria to advise and organize the supply of weapons to Lebanese Hezbollah. Iran's large armed missile and drone attacks against Israel on April 4 – an effort to establish deterrence against Israel – drew support from the United States and the West, as well as moderate Arab support for the efforts. Israelis to intercept almost the entire barrage. Since then, Israel has continued to strike IRGC targets in Syria, increasing the risk of another major clash between Israel and Iran which, unlike the April exchanges, did not involve Iran and the United States in direct hostilities.

American, European and regional diplomats were initially reassured that the peak of the regional conflict in April subsequently subsided to a pre-existing baseline in which Israel, the Axis of Resistance, the States -United States and their allies engaged in relatively limited actions. -intensity conflict aimed at establishing deterrence. This optimism may prove short-lived, however, as signs mount that Israel may try to achieve by force what American and French diplomats have so far failed to do: force Hezbollah to withdraw its elite units at least eight kilometers from the Israeli-Lebanese border. border (“Blue Line.”)

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had promised Israelis that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would, if necessary, push Hezbollah units from the border to give 60,000 Israelis in northern towns and villages assurance that they could return home safely. In May and June, Israeli and Hezbollah units began striking and retaliating deeper inside their respective countries, causing significant damage as well as raising concern among U.S. officials that Israel might be preparing the battlefield to a large-scale IDF attack. These officials increasingly fear that Israel will start a war against Hezbollah in Lebanon that it will not be able to complete without American support. On June 11, an Israeli strike killed Taleb Abdullah, one of the top commanders of Hezbollah's military wing, triggering major retaliations and raising fears that an all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah could erupt. On June 13, Hezbollah said it fired 150 rockets and launched 30 suicide drones at Israeli military positions – its largest-scale response since it began firing on Israel on October 8 in an effort to immobilize the IDF forces that might otherwise deploy to the Gaza front. .

In addition to warning Israeli leaders that an all-out attack on Hezbollah would bring widespread destruction to Israel as well as Lebanon, and possibly draw Iran into battle as well, U.S. and allied officials have accelerated their diplomacy to try to defuse the situation. Israel-Lebanon Front. On June 13, French President Emmanuel Macron presented a proposal to try to advance a long-standing but largely stalled U.S. and French effort under which Hezbollah's elite Radwan unit would deploy no closer than five miles of the Blue Line – in exchange for the end of the Blue Line. Israeli attacks against Hezbollah forces. “With the United States, we have agreed on the principle of trilateral cooperation. [contact group] – Israel, the United States and France – to move forward on the road map that we have proposed, and we will do the same with the Lebanese authorities,” Macron said.

Israeli leaders have expressed a clear preference for U.S. officials to be the primary mediators in Lebanon. Apparently reflecting this preference, Amos Hochstein, one of President Biden's top diplomatic advisers, is arriving in Israel on June 17 to work on de-escalating the conflict, according to a U.S. official. The diplomacy follows a visit to the United States in June by Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Joseph Aoun to discuss the role the LAF should play in securing the southern border area if Hezbollah agreed to withdraw its elite forces in the region. The military's leading role in securing the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line is enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution 1701, but Hezbollah has consistently violated the resolution by deploying to the border.

The ongoing war in Gaza has also prevented resolution of the Red Sea crisis created by the leaders of Yemen's Houthi movement (Ansarallah), who have attacked commercial ships in the Red Sea in support of Hamas in Gaza. Recent long lulls in armed drone, anti-ship cruise, and ballistic missile attacks against U.S. and allied warships and commercial vessels in the Red Sea have led experts to assess that the Houthis' arsenal may have been exhausted by the group's attacks and by American and British strikes. on its weapons stocks. However, in June, the Houthis appeared to resume their almost daily rhythm of attacks.

On June 12, a Houthi drone boat and missile strike disabled the M/V Tutor, a Liberian-flagged, Greek-owned and operated bulk carrier, off the coast of the Houthi-controlled port of Hodeidah. The crew, mostly Filipino, abandoned ship and were rescued by U.S. and partner forces, with the ship drifting and taking on water. Further attacks the same week damaged another ship, the Verbena, in the Gulf of Aden, also abandoned by its crew on June 15, as well as two other commercial vessels, “marking a significant increase in losses.” [Houthi] efficiency,” said British security company Ambrey.

The Houthi attacks in June demonstrated that US and British airstrikes against Houthi stockpiles and missile and drone launchers since January have failed to deter the Houthis. In response, a US-led coalition apparently decided to broaden the target in an attempt to cripple the Houthis' capacity. On May 30, US and British strikes targeted a civilian facility – a radio station controlled by the Houthis – killing at least 16 people. It was the deadliest coalition attack by the Houthi rebels to date. On June 14, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), the U.S. military command responsible for the region, announced that it had successfully destroyed seven Houthi radars that “allow the Houthis to target maritime vessels and endanger commercial shipping.” The strikes appear to represent a US attempt to “prevent” the Houthis from locating ships, targeting and detecting coalition aircraft and other weapons.

In recent weeks, US and British attacks have also been reported to have targeted Houthi patrol boats, helicopters and other military equipment in an attempt to make the Houthis weaker and less confident in their ability to continue their campaign against Western interests. The expanded target may also reflect what U.S. military officers acknowledge to journalists as “grunting” among the crews of U.S. warships under constant threat in the Red Sea, who are apparently campaigning for the U.S. Navy to strike harder against the Houthis. However, it is likely that US leaders will only intensify their action against the Houthis gradually and in small steps, seeking to avoid provoking conflict with the Houthis' main mentor, Iran, or contradicting the efforts of the Houthis. Saudi Arabia to seek a peace deal with the Houthis in Yemen's civil conflict. conflict.

U.S. commanders tell reporters there is a good chance that the Houthis' growing expertise will, at some point, allow the movement to successfully strike a U.S. or allied warship — an attack likely to cause casualties in due to the large volume of highly explosive weapons on board warships. A mass casualty event would almost certainly cause U.S. leaders to deploy the full force of their capabilities against the Houthis, even if doing so carries a high risk of expanding the war throughout the region.