Germany's direct play defeats Denmark and proves a useful weapon for Julian Nageslmann

The matches played in the group stage are different from the knockout matches of any international competition.

Theoretically, opponents become tougher as you progress towards the later stages of a tournament and they also have a better idea of ​​how you have played up to that point.

After three games, it is possible to analyse how a team plays with and without the ball with a recent sample, rather than a sample taken from the international friendlies of March and June.

If we take the example of Germany, their opponents now know that in possession of the ball, Toni Kroos will retreat to the left side of the defense to form a 3-1 with Robert Andrich in front of him.

From this remote position, Kroos directed the German attacks as they attempted to find the three narrow number 10s between the lines. “Playing with Toni, I have the freedom to stay more in front and wait because I know the ball is going to come at some point,” Ilkay Gundogan said recently The Athletic.

“He reads the game, gives us balance with and without the ball, and he gives other players like me more freedom to put themselves in dangerous positions. »

Therefore, any team that wants to limit the German threat on the ball and not fall victim to the complex combinations of Gundogan, Jamal Musiala, Kai Havertz and Florian Wirtz must stop the supply at its source.

The round of 16 produced a new contender, with Denmark looking to achieve this by first pressing Germany who led 3-1 and taking care of the rest of the problems later.

Out of their 5-4-1 shape, Denmark focused on the pressing of Antonio Rudiger, Nico Schlotterbeck and Kroos using Christian Eriksen, Rasmus Hojlund and Andreas Skov Olsen, with Thomas Delaney and Pierre-Emile Hojbjerg in zonal roles behind them.

Eriksen had a complex role as he had to drop back and support Denmark's left-back and centre-back, but Skov Olsen's main task without the ball was to stifle Kroos and not give him time to play on the ball.

The logical question was how Denmark could use five players to press four German players without getting into trouble, as that numerical advantage offered Julian Nagelsmann's team a six-on-five scenario behind Delaney and Hojbjerg.

The first part of the answer was that the Danish midfield duo dropped out to help their central defenders follow Leroy Sane, Gundogan and Musiala.

Here Skov Olsen presses Kroos and Delaney collects the deflected pass, but even though it goes around the attacker, Hojbjerg heads towards Musiala.

The other was that the Danish back five changed markers effectively to defend against the three German No.10s.

In this example, Schlotterbeck finds an angle to pass towards Gundogan, but Jannik Vestergaard immediately jumps towards the German captain and Joachim Andersen moves inside to collect Havertz.

Gundogan then tries to return the ball to the Arsenal striker, but Andersen intercepts it and launches the counterattack, finding Skov Olsen.

Germany's impressive start to the match was tempered by Denmark's organization without the ball, which also created transitional situations for Kasper Hjulmand's team. Pressure from Skov Olsen forced Kroos to make safer passes instead of crossing the line and, on a few occasions, make mistakes.

Denmark's best chance in the first half came from winning the ball back and hitting on the counter. Here, Eriksen goes deeper to support the left side of the Danish defense, Hojbjerg picks up Gundogan, Skov Olsen puts pressure on Schlotterbeck and Hojlund is able to limit Kroos' time on the ball. This forces the German midfielder to play the quickest pass available towards Musiala and Andersen jumps to press him.

Musiala tries to find Andrich, but Delaney intercepts the pass to start the counterattack and it ends with Manuel Neuer saving a one-on-one situation against Hojlund.

Denmark's off-the-ball approach limited Germany's attacking threat in open play, but Nagelsmann's side showed they have several options with the ball.

Due to Eriksen's complex role out of possession, Rudiger had more time on the ball than Schlotterbeck and Kroos and the Real Madrid defender tried to find Havertz's run behind the defense on several occasions.

Similar to the 2-0 win over Hungary, Havertz attacked the space behind the centre-back as the latter stepped forward to become one of Germany's No.10s.

In this example, Eriksen is deeper than Skov Olsen, allowing Rudiger more time on the ball compared to Kroos.

As the central defender looks for runners, Havertz attacks the space behind Andreas Christensen, who must keep an eye on Sane. Rudiger's pass finds Havertz, but Vestergaard is in a good position to defend this attack.

In another example, Andersen moves to follow Musiala's positioning between the lines and Havertz moves intelligently to the vacant space in the Danish defence.

When Andrich passes the ball to Rudiger, Havertz is in position to attack the space behind Andersen…

…and he runs into this area while being on Vestergaard's blind side. Rudiger finds him…

…but Havertz's shot is stopped by Kasper Schmeichel.

Although Rudiger's long passes were a viable attacking option, Germany had to tweak their setup to ask Denmark different questions.

In the second half they changed their preparation from a 3-1 to a 4-2 shape with Kroos alongside Andrich and launched the attacks from deeper positions.

Denmark responded by pushing Hojbjerg to mark Kroos, but that increased the distance between their midfield and defensive line, leaving them vulnerable in that area and if they pushed up, the German centre-backs could play long passes in behind the defence.

In this example, Havertz drops down to offer himself as a passer, forcing the Danish defence to move up. Schlotterbeck spots Musiala's complementary run behind the defence, who are being pulled in two directions, and passes the ball into his path, with Sane making a similar run on the other side.

Musiala's back pass was intercepted by Vestergaard but Germany managed to win a penalty after David Raum's cross hit Andersen's right hand. Havertz scored from the spot to give the Germans the lead.

The second German goal came from a similar situation. Hojbjerg and Delaney headed towards Kroos, while Emre Can and Musiala squeezed into the space between the lines, forcing Andersen to follow him.

Musiala then changes direction and runs behind the defense, where Schlotterbeck plays the long pass…

…and the Bayern Munich striker slots the ball into the bottom corner to make it 2-0.

In the second half of the first half, Germany struggled with and without the ball, but by adjusting their build-up structure at half-time and switching to a clearer five-man defence out of possession with the introduction of Can, they put themselves on course for the quarter-finals.

Germany's individual quality and consistent style make them a serious title contender, with their ability to refine their approach only adding to their strengths.