Can minimum deterrence save nuclear arms control?

Estimates were made of the number of weapons available for retaliatory attacks under four possible force structures for each state. For the United States, the four structures include: a balanced triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bomber-launched weapons; a dyad without ICBM; a dyad without bombers; and a force based entirely on SLBMs. For Russia, the four force structures include: a balanced triad; a dyad of ICBMs and bombers; a dyad of ICBMs and SLBMs; and a force composed entirely of ICBMs. The alternatives to the triads for each country reflect differences in their force modernization priorities based on past experience: ICBMs for Russia and SLBMs and bombers for the United States. Current U.S. and Russian modernization plans call for continued modernization of the Triads; hypothetical alternatives are included for comparison.

In the canonical case often used for analysis (but not necessarily reflecting the probability of actual operations), a US or Russian strategic nuclear triad, under “warning generated, overcoming attack” conditions, could provide more 500 weapons of retaliation. within a deployment limit of 1,000 warheads. For a deployment limit of 500 nuclear warheads, a U.S. retaliatory triad, on alert and overcoming attack, could provide more than 300 survivable and retaliatory weapons; under the same conditions, a Russian triad would produce more than 200 retaliatory warheads.

Objections to minimal deterrence. Objections to the preceding analysis and argumentation can be anticipated in the following lines:

First, China might not play. Until China feels it has achieved essential nuclear strategic parity with the United States and Russia, Beijing may lose interest in nuclear arms control. On the other hand, this objection might apply only or primarily to the accounting aspect of nuclear force reductions and required inspections.

The United States and Russia would benefit from including China in multilateral discussions on the nature of strategy and strategic thinking, threat perceptions and the international environment, and the need for international collaboration on issues such as non-proliferation and nuclear risk reduction. Ultimately, China may find a comfort zone as one of the three major nuclear-weapon states, appreciate the symbolic and substantive benefits of sharing arms control preeminence in international forums, and conclude that it would be smarter to be included in the arms control tent rather than staying on the sidelines. From this.

China can be expected to move gradually towards nuclear arms control – unaccustomed to the transparency required in negotiations on arms limitation and reduction. However, China may eventually decide that the alternative to participation would be apparent obliviousness on the part of its leaders to the possibility of an uncontrolled nuclear arms race.

Part of the concern over China's rise to nuclear power is the fear that China and Russia could combine their strategic nuclear forces and pose an insurmountable threat to current U.S. nuclear modernization plans. In a worst-case deterrence failure, the United States could find itself attacked simultaneously in Europe and Asia by large-scale conventional forces backed by the implicit or explicit threat of joint Sino-Russian use of arms. tactical or strategic nuclear weapons. On the other hand, it cannot be assumed that an outbreak of a wider war in Europe would necessarily lead China to unite with Russia under all circumstances. Nor would Russia necessarily come to China's aid in the event of a crisis in Asia. Much would depend on the circumstances regarding the political motivations of each side.

A second objection to minimum deterrence proposals might come from military planners and those who make decisions about nuclear employment policy. Would a minimum deterrence regime allow the United States to deploy a force that offered more flexible options than a one-size-fits-all “wargasm” that limited policymakers' range of choices under demanding conditions of deterrence failure?

The answer to this concern is that, as long as America's arsenal is limited to the same number as that of potential adversaries, no power should be at a disadvantage relative to others with respect to its flexible targeting and control capabilities. escalation. In fact, compared to the strategic nuclear forces of Russia and China, the United States would offer more flexibility than those of Russia or China, because most of the American deterrent lies in submarines. -ballistic missiles, the most survivable element of any strategic nuclear triad. In theory, Russia and China could ally with the United States and far surpass the Americans in the number of operationally deployed weapons. In practice, however, it is difficult to imagine Russia or China following the other side's lead and embarking on a holocaust – even under their best circumstances.

A third objection to a minimum deterrence regime for strategic nuclear forces is that it does not address the problem of non-strategic nuclear weapons. The concern is valid, but non-strategic nuclear weapons come in so many varieties that separate negotiations will be necessary to reach agreement on a formula among the United States, Russia and China, as well as among others States possessing nuclear weapons or aspiring to become a NWS. But the United States and Russia should prioritize bilateral negotiations over the fate of non-strategic nuclear weapons currently deployed in Europe.

A fourth concern with the preceding analysis is that it provides no solution to prevent the rise of new nuclear-weapon states, particularly those with revisionist goals relative to the existing international order.[8] Guilty as charged. The most immediate concern here is a nuclear Iran, but also further misbehavior by North Korea that encourages South Korea, Japan, or other U.S. allies in Asia to become nuclear weapons states.

No silver bullet is proposed here to ensure against an expanded club of nuclear-weapon states. But a combination of good examples set under a minimum deterrence regime – with successful deterrence or other persuasion against additional nuclear weaponry – is a possible path to revive an otherwise threatened non-proliferation regime .[9]

An option to avoid a nuclear arms race. Minimum deterrence is a concept, and the need for adaptive concepts is urgent because the international system has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. Minimum deterrence can be a practical consolation prize for supporters of nuclear abolition or, at the same time, a symbol of the stagnation or decline of American nuclear power for those favoring more ambitious strategies.[10] At the very least, minimal deterrence should contribute to serious discussions about limits on the size of strategic nuclear forces between the United States, Russia, and China. An unlimited arms race only invites instability.

In addition to the challenge of “how much is enough” when it comes to nuclear weapons and launchers, minimum deterrence will also need to adjust its targeting plans to adapt to the new technological environment of the 21st.^st century. Weapons intended to destroy the “war industry” or national economies will be less relevant than the ability to disable or destroy the nerve of political control of the state and the brain and central nervous system of the armed forces. Therefore, the first strikes will likely be carried out against cyber systems and space assets intended for reconnaissance and warning, navigation, C3 (command, control and communications) and other vital military functions.

Finally, experts disagree on whether nuclear superiority correlates with favorable outcomes in coercive negotiations between rivals. For example, Todd S. Sechser, an expert at the University of Virginia, and Matthew Fuhrmann, a political scientist at Teas A&M, argue that “states rarely behave as if nuclear superiority gives them advantages in coercive negotiations.”[11] On the other hand, Matthew Kroenig, a government professor at Georgetown University, develops a theory of “synthesis of superiority and brinkmanship” according to which “military nuclear advantages increase a state's willingness to run risks in international conflicts.[12] Both arguments are supported by numerous statistical analyzes and case studies.

It would appear that the weaker the link between nuclear superiority and favorable negotiation outcomes, the stronger the case for minimum force size and capabilities. But in matters of deterrence, as in war, the enemy always gets a vote. Therefore, any U.S. strategic nuclear posture and any arms control regime that supports it should continue to include a “hedge” capability in the face of unforeseen challenges and nuclear “black swans.”