10am to 10am: 10 lessons learned as the International Nuclear Disarmament Verification Partnership turns 10

The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) – a partnership of 30 countries and the European Union working to identify and develop practical solutions to the technical and procedural challenges associated with effective nuclear disarmament verification – is celebrating its tenth anniversary in Geneva this week. This milestone has brought with it notable results and achievements, which have been highlighted in a dedicated IPNDV report. Looking back on IPNDV’s past activities and looking ahead, here are ten conclusions or lessons learned over the years:

1. Continued dialogue on nuclear disarmament verification is essential: When IPNDV was launched in December 2014 by the U.S. Department of State and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), the geopolitical world was very different than it is today. Given the growing geopolitical challenges of recent years, which have a clear impact on the international non-proliferation regime and discussions on nuclear disarmament, it is important that this partnership continues its efforts to identify and develop practical solutions to the challenges. techniques and procedures for effective verification of nuclear disarmament.
2. All States can contribute to certain aspects of nuclear disarmament verification: No other initiative has brought together as many technical experts and government representatives from nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) to jointly address the process and technical challenges of nuclear disarmament verification. The Partnership includes 30 countries from all continents, plus the European Union. Efforts are underway to include more nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states.
3. Multilateral verification of nuclear disarmament is possible: By the end of Phase I (2015-2017), the Partnership had affirmed as a key judgment that the dismantling of nuclear warheads under multilateral control should be possible while successfully managing concerns regarding safety, security, -proliferation and classification. This key judgment was reinforced at the end of Phase II (2018-2019) and again during Phase III (2020-2025), noting that “the results of the Partnership should pave the way for multilaterally verified nuclear disarmament.”
4. LWork on the conceptual aspects of nuclear disarmament verification can guide the development of robust verification regimes in future nuclear disarmament agreement negotiations: Since Phase I, IPNDV has focused on “creating a conceptual roadmap” and has so far developed a comprehensive framework for nuclear disarmament verification, including general verification objectives, verification principles, verification goals, and scenario-specific concepts and models.
5. The development and testing of monitoring and inspection processes, procedures, techniques and technologies (PPTT) can provide options toolbox for future verification of nuclear disarmament:Over the past ten years, IPNDV has developed a comprehensive verification toolbox that offers options for declarations and notifications, on-site inspections (including managed access arrangements) and verification technologies (including information barriers). Since Phase II, moving “from paper to practice”, several exercises and technology demonstrations have tested and evaluated different PPTTs, including the Franco-German Nuclear Disarmament Verification (NuDiVe) exercises in 2019 and 2022 at Forschungszentrum Jülich, Germany, and the measurement campaigns at the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre, BeCamp in 2019 and BeCamp2 in 2023. In Phase III, aimed at “addressing complexities and building confidence”, the toolbox was applied in two different scenarios. Based on the hypothetical nuclear weapons state of Ipinodvia, its disarmament obligations in the context of limiting its nuclear arsenal to 500 nuclear warheads and reducing its nuclear arsenal from 500 to zero nuclear warheads were addressed. In addition, the Partnership has intensified its efforts in the area of ​​strategic considerations related to nuclear disarmament verification, including a systemic approach.
6. Nuclear disarmament verification is a confidence-building process: The IPNDV identified the various practical, technical and legal factors that influence the level of confidence in nuclear disarmament verification. Although absolute confidence in verification cannot be achieved in this context, the Partnership concluded that confidence in verification should be seen as the cumulative result of the various monitoring and inspection activities carried out over an extended period of time.
7. Capacity building is essential to develop and implement nuclear disarmament verification: The Partnership has contributed significantly to capacity building in nuclear disarmament verification by engaging a diverse group of countries and experts in working groups, exercises, and technology demonstrations. In addition, IPNDV activities have also informed other efforts to provide solutions for nuclear disarmament verification, such as the Menzingen Verification Experiment in 2023 and the discussions of the “Group of Governmental Experts to Consider Further Issues of Nuclear Disarmament Verification” (GGE-NDV) (2021-2023), established by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Capacity building also takes place through the IPNDV website, which provides access to numerous documents and reports on a wide range of aspects of nuclear disarmament verification.
8. More conceptual and technical work needs to be done: The Partnership has defined a program to continue its work to refine verification concepts, addressing in more detail, among others, absence verification, disposition verification and the systems approach. The Partnership also proposes to continue technology assessment and to pay more attention to verification options without radiation measurements or information barriers. Technical exercises and demonstrations will also continue to be useful for testing and evaluating both concepts and technologies.
9. It is important to intensify nuclear disarmament verification efforts: Although IPNDV has increased its outreach to other nuclear disarmament verification actors following the COVID-19 pandemic, these efforts could be further intensified, including by engaging with States and NGOs in the NPT review process. Although the UNGA could consider follow-up discussions after the positive conclusion of the last GGE-NDV, the IPNDV could continue to offer its assistance and expertise to any nuclear disarmament verification efforts within the UN framework.
10. Progress in nuclear disarmament verification contributes to strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (TNP): Given that Article 6 of the NPT obliges all States Parties to strive to achieve general and complete nuclear disarmament, any progress in effective verification of nuclear disarmament, combined with political will, can lead to a world without nuclear weapons.

Nuclear disarmament is a challenge that will remain on the agenda for a long time, as will nuclear disarmament verification. Therefore, scientific and technical developments, knowledge management and capacity building of countries that wish to participate more actively in this field and of the next generation of experts must continue. Together with other initiatives, the IPNDV has laid the foundations for future work on nuclear disarmament verification.

The opinions expressed above represent the views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the ELN or any of its members. The aim of the ELN is to encourage debates that will help develop Europe's capacity to address the pressing foreign, defence and security policy challenges of our time.

Image: Flickr, United States Mission in Geneva